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Abstract—We address the problem of maintaining high voltage
power transmission networks in security at all time, namely
anticipating exceeding of thermal limit for eventual single line
disconnection (whatever its cause may be) by running slow, but
accurate, physical grid simulators.
New conceptual frameworks are calling for a probabilistic risk-
based security criterion. However, these approaches suffer from
high requirements in terms of tractability. Here, we propose a
new method to assess the risk. This method uses both machine
learning techniques (artificial neural networks) and more stan-
dard simulators based on physical laws. More specifically we
train neural networks to estimate the overall dangerousness of a
grid state. A classical benchmark problem (manpower 118 buses
test case) is used to show the strengths of the proposed method.
I. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Today’s European power-grids are facing new challenges.
Renewable energies such as wind and solar power play an
increasing role in the production. The electricity market is
growing, and the total demand has stopped increasing. All
these factors combined make the task more difficult for TSOs.
In the past, the rise in complexity was managed by building
new heavy infrastructures required by the growth of consump-
tion. This is not possible anymore since growth in revenue is
stalling as well. TSO’s need to be addressed by optimizing
current infrastructures, finding new flexibilities.
It is then becoming more critical for TSOs today to move
away from reactive real time grid management to an approach
based on anticipation with real time automation. This means
that TSO’s should make studies in anticipation, with grids
states coming from forecast available at the date and time
of the study. This introduce even more variability in the
grids states. One way to tackle of these uncertainties is to
use a Monte Carlo approaches presented in the ITESLA1
framework. This means simulating a lot of possible grid states,
and increasing the computation needed to assess the security.
This computational need is also induced by the GARPUR
methodology, where a stochastic security criterion has been
defined.
In this paper, we will (1) study the risk of a given grid
state (see section II equation 1 for a formal definition of this
risk), (2) propose a method to rank contingencies in decreasing
severity, (3) evaluate the potential cost of not simulating a set
of contingencies V (what is called "residual risk" in the next
1See http://www.itesla-project.eu/itesla-results.html for more information.
sections) and (4) to propose a way to mix regular approaches
and machine learning to increase computational speed without
sacrificing accuracy
Other authors use machine learning to address power system
related problems. In these papers, most of the time people try
to classify grid state according to some security criteria ([1],
[2], [3], [4]), or to predict how a system will react after an
unplanned event occur ([5]). We believe our approach to be
different: we learn how to rank contingencies in order to run
physical simulators on a limited accurate amount of situations
Our proposed method relies on previously published work
in [6] and [7] in which we devised a neural-network trained
with "guided dropout", to predict power flows in power grids
for given topology variants while training only on a small
subset of these. We pursue the evaluation of this strategy in
this paper, where neural networks are solely trained on a small
set of configurations (less than 1%).
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND NOTATIONS
Under our assumptions, a “system state” x consists of
the power flowing in all lines, resulting from given (fixed)
injections, for a specific grid topology. We always analyze
a situation corresponding to a fixed state in this paper and
sometimes omit x for brevity of notation. We also omit
to specify time ordering, although states are time ordered.
A contingency z might arise with probability p(z) and is
associated with a loss function L(z;x). For instance, events z
might be single line disconnections occurring with probability
p(z) = pi(1) or double line disconnections occurring with
probability p(z) = pi(2) = pi(1)2 (thus assuming that two
disconnections are independent). The overall risk is defined
as:
Rmax(x) =
∑
z∈Z
p(z)L(z;x) (1)
This definition is like the one presented in [8] Eq. 3, for
instance. In our application context, we assume that L(six) is
the {0, 1} loss, with 0 meaning that the contingency z arising
in state x is innocuous and 1 that it is risky or "dangerous"
for our system (i.e. at least one line, still in service after z
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arose, will exceed its thermal limit). Thus:
L(z;x) =

0 “No current flowing on any line
exceeds the line thermal limit
under contingency z
in grid state x”⇒ OK
1 “Otherwise”⇒ “Bad” contingencies
(2)
Estimating the real damage of the grid would endure after con-
tingency z would require computing the real "real" behaviour
of the grid including corrective actions, load shedding and
a full "cascading failure" (as presented in [9] for example),
which is computationally too expensive to calculate presently.
We could also refine this loss L(z;x) in multiple fashion.
We could for instance take into account the depth of conges-
tions. One step further, we could use ITESLA Methodology
to further take into account the flexibilities on the grid and
classify contingencies in 4 categories: 1) not dangerous 2)
dangerous, but corrective action can be implemented to restore
the security 3) dangerous, but there exists a preventive action
that can still be taken to cure the grid 4) dangerous, and no
known solution to cure the grid exists.
Our approach is different: our loss can be interpreted as
"L(z;x) = 0: no need to manually study the contingency,
the grid is safe" and "L(z;x) = 1: the contingency is not
safe, a more precise evaluation of its impact must be carried
out, either manually, or with the more accurate simulator". We
believe this approach of mixing machine learning for ranking,
and physical simulation for grid state evaluation is promising
and show it in the section V.
As we already explained, the computational budget needed
to be performed will drastically increase in the near future
Because of computational costs, we cannot carry out all the
computation needed as explained in the ITESLA project see
2). Hence, we will use a "fast proxy"3 that will rank the
contingencies z ∈ Z to focus our computational budget
(number of call to the physical simulator) on the most critical
one.
If we evaluate with the physical simulator a set V of
contingencies, the residual risk corresponding to events in
Z − V is:
R(V;x) =
∑
z∈Z−V
p(z)L(z;x) (3)
This corresponds to the risk taken of not computing (with the
physical simulator) the contingencies in Z −V with the slow
simulator. This residual risk R is bounded between:
R(Z;x) = 0 and R(∅;x) = Rmax(x) (4)
In this paper, because we use a benchmark of modest
size, we can exhaustively compute L(z;x) for all z with
the physical simulator to presents results. In practice R(V;x)
2See the ITELSA project at http://www.itesla-project.eu/index.html.
3Using neural network with dedicated architecture will shows that a speed-
up of more than 1.000 is achievable compare to actual load-flow simulators.
might have to be approximated by replacing L(z;x) with an
approximate loss Lˆ(z;x), obtained using power flows esti-
mated by our “proxy” simulator (precisely defined in section
IV equation 18).
III. THE POWER GRID PROBLEM
In this paper, we consider only two kinds of contingencies:
“single contingency”, denoted by zi, representing the discon-
nection of one single power line, and “double contingency”
zi,j representing the disconnection of two lines.
After the power grid suffered a single contingency, we will
say its state is in "n-1" If n denotes the number of lines in
our power grid, there are exactly n different "n-1" grid states.
Similarly, a power grid suffering a double contingency will be
referred to as a "n-2".
A. Beyond "N-1" security policy
Commonly, TSO operate the grid using the so called "N-
1" security policy. This policy stipulates that should ANY
unplanned single contingency occurs, the flow on all the lines
of the power grid must remain below their thermal limits, or
be set back by a curative action within an authorized short
time window . This terminology should not be confused with
the "n-1" state in which the grid finds itself after one line
disconnection. In fact assessing the "N-1" security requires
computing at least n load-flows, each one corresponding to
one possible "n-1" grid state.
For example, the French power grid counts approximately
n ≈ 10000 power lines. Thus, assessing the "N-1" security of
this network requires ≈ 10000 load-flows, and assessing the
"N-2" security would require on the order of n(n−1)2 ≈ 50 106
load flow evaluations. In this context, it is understandable
given a computation budget near real time that TSO’s do not
operate under higher order security policies, such as "N-2"
(two line disconnections), "N-3", and so on, which most of
the time have very low probability.
One of our motivation for studying "N-2" grid safety is
that TSO operators must anticipate future grid states on an
ever longer horizon to guarantee security as we have already
developed in previous sections so that there is time to test
if a remedial actions can be taken in real time. Our method
would allow to gain speed in evaluating grid security. This
could allow TSO to reduce cost by a better anticipation of the
risk, or increase the security, with a given budget.
During the training the neural network sees only states
where at most one power line is disconnected (single con-
tingencies). As the neural network never sees at training time,
states where 2 power lines where missing, evaluating "N-2"
security is an effective way to evaluate how well our estimation
will perform in unseen scenarios (when grid states it is tested
on differs from what it learns). This is really important in
practice. For such critical systems as the power grid, we must
make sure the method does not lead to taking bad decisions
when facing unseen configurations.
Given their really low probability of occurrence, we ignore
the effects (and the residual risk) associated with higher order
2
contingencies ("n-3", "n-4", etc.). As a further simplification,
we assume that all single disconnections zi have equal prob-
ability:
p(zi)
def
= pi(1) (5)
and all double disconnection zi,j have equal probability:
p(zi,j)
def
= pi(2) = pi
2
(1). (6)
In reality, such probabilities vary depending on factors such
as line length, pair of line proximity, local climate, weather
variations, etc. Such variations are neglected in the present
paper, but can make area of future studies.
B. Parameters setting
In this section we expose how we choose the parameters
of our experiment to be as realistic as possible of the French
power grid.
Expert dispatchers (TSO operators responsible of the grid
security) estimate that a full "N-1" simulation yields approx-
imately 100 "bad" events (dangerous contingencies) for the
peak total demand. This means that approximately 1% of
the single events should present a serious risk requiring a
corrective action. To respect the order of magnitude of this
proportion of "bad" events, we used a calibration dataset,
which allowed us to set the thermal limits of each line in our
test case grid. Having set these values, we evaluate them on the
full "N-1" for 100 different grid states4, requiring to compute
18 600 load flows. Among all the "n-1" events investigated,
1.75% were found unsafe in our simulations and 4.22% for
"n-2" events.
We want our study to be representative of the behavior of
the French power grid. we also used real data coming from
the French power grid starting January 1st 1994 to December
31st 2015 to have estimates of pi(1) and pi(2) on the French
power grid. We avoided choosing time segments during which
catastrophic events occurred5. Indeed they are not particularly
relevant for our study and would lead to overestimating these
probabilities. Our dataset contains the dates and times of all
failures of RTE material during the time segment chosen. We
estimate the probability of single failure per hour as:
piFR(1) =
nf
nh.n
(7)
where nf and nh are the number of failures and the number of
hours in our dataset respectively, and n the number of power
lines. This gives us an estimate of the French single line failure
probability:
piFR(1) ≈ 1.2 10−6 (8)
This means that, on average, a given powerline i will fail
nearly once every 106 hours6. With the same technique, we
found that:
piFR(2) ≈ 2.2 10−11 (9)
4See the section ?? for a detailed description of this dataset.
5For example the "Lothar" windstorm of December 26th 1999, "Martin"
windstorm of December 27th-28th 1999 or the "Klaus" windstorm of January
23rd-24th 2009
6This is more than 100 years.
In this paper, we consider a smaller test case counting only
186 power lines (instead of nFR ' 10 000 for the French
powergrid). Using the same probabilities for this smaller test
case would lead to greatly underestimate the residual risk
associated with the double contingencies.
This led us to make adjustments to these probabilities. Let’s
consider the worst possible case, where all the contingencies
are bad, to have an upper bound on the risk. In the French
power system, the residual risk associated with all the "N-1"
contingencies is piFR(1)×nFR ≈ 0.12 and the risk associated with
all the double contingencies is piFR(2)× n.(n−1)2 ≈ 0.06. Keeping
the ratio "risk N-1 / risk N-2" constant across the grid state
yields to consider:
pi(1) × n
pi(2) × n(n−1)2
=
piFR(1) × nFR
piFR(2) × n
FR(nFR−1)
2
≈ 0.12
0.06
(10)
Together with the assumption made in equation 6 and using
n = 186 (the size of our test case grid), we obtain :
pi(1) ≈ 5.4 10−3 (11)
pi(2) ≈ 2.9 10−5 (12)
If these scaling where not performed, the residual risk
associated with all the double contingencies in our test cases
could be completely neglected compare to the risk associated
with single ones. There would not be any advantages of using
machine learning, as the accumulated risk of all the double
contingencies would be almost zero7. This would lead to
underestimate this risk associated to the double contingencies
on the French power grid artificially (due to the size of our
test case).
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Suppose we have a high end slow simulator and low end
fast proxy simulator. We would like to take the most of them
by combining them in a smart way, to best estimate the risk
given an available computational budget. To do so, we first
compute an estimate of the loss of contingency z on grid
state x (denoted above L(z;x)). Then we are able to have
an unbiased estimator of its severity score p(z).L(z;x) (eg
the loss scaled with the probability of the contingency).
Considering a fixed grid state x and a given contingency
z, we denote by fi the flow, computed with the high-end
simulator, on the inth line of grid x after contingency z occurs,
and by f¯i the thermal limit for this line.
We propose to first train a neural network with “guided
dropout”, as describe in [7] to approximate rapidly the power
flow for the given grid state x and contingency z. During the
training step, only single contingencies are seen by the neural
network.
Once the neural network is trained, we use it to predict
flows. fˆi denotes the flow predicted by our proxy (in this case
our neural network) for the inth line of the power grid.
7It would be of ≈ 10−7 if ALL the double contingencies causes security
problem, compare to ≈ 10−6 if ONLY ONE single contingencies causes
problem.
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It has been observed that neural networks tend to be "over
confident" in their predictions (see for example [10]). This
overconfidence could lead to a bad ranking with dramatic
effects in practice. We propose to calibrate the score of our
neural network by taking into account a fixed (yet calibrated)
uncertainty by assuming:
∀i, (fi − fˆi) ∼ N (0, σi) (13)
where σi represents the model uncertainty for line i. This
is a really simplistic model of the error of our model but
this assumption is often made in practice, and sufficient for
our needs here, as shown in section V. In the presented
experiments, we calibrate the vector σ (of dimension n) using
a calibration set distinct from the training set. For real time
operation, this vector σ can be calibrated using grid states
available in real time, but for which the neural network has
still not be trained on8.
On this calibration set, we compute the true values fi, using
the high-end simulator, and the predictions fˆi coming from our
proxy: σi is set to:
σi
def
=
1
number of simulations
.
∑
simulations
(fˆi − fi)2 (14)
These σi’s are then used to compute the scores Lˆi that a
given line is above its thermal limit as:
Lˆ
(aux)
i
def
= 1− Fσi(f¯i − fˆi) (15)
where Fσi is the cumulative density function of the Normal
law with mean 0 and variance σi. This is equivalent to comput-
ing the "p-value" in the statistical test "fˆi ≤ f¯i supposing the
error are normally distributed (eg supposing equation 13). For
our problem, a grid is said to be “non secure” after contingency
z, if at least one of its line is above its thermal limit. The score
of the power grid, in state x after contingency z, is then obtain
with:
Lˆ(aux)(z;x)
def
= max
1≤i≤n
Lˆ
(aux)
i (z;x) (16)
This estimator Lˆ(aux)(z;x) is a biased stochastic estimator
of the true risk L(z;x): E
(
Lˆ(aux)(z;x)
)
6= L(z;x). We use
the same calibration set to evaluate:
b
def
= Ecalibration set
(
Lˆ(aux)(z;x)
)
− L(z;x) (17)
We then finally obtain the unbiased estimator of the severity
of the contingency z on situation x:
Lˆ(z;x)
def
= max{Lˆ(aux)(z;x)− b, 0} (18)
This "evaluated loss" Lˆ(z;x) is an unbiased estimator of the
loss of the contingency z: L(z;x). An estimator of the severity
score of contingency z is then
sˆ(z;x)
def
= Lˆ(z;x).p(z) (19)
8the operator would still perform the full "N-1" computation, and this
computations can be used to calibrate this vector
This severity score sˆ(z;x) is an estimator of the impact of
not computing the contingencies z on the total risk defined in
equation 1: it is the estimate of L(z;x).p(z). Contingencies are
ranked according to their respective severity score sˆ(z;x): we
want first to simulate contingencies that can cause the highest
damage (pondered with the probability of occurrence). And the
associated empirical maximum risk Rˆmax(x), and empirical
residual risk Rˆ(V, x) are defined with
Rˆmax(x)
def
=
∑
z∈Z
p(z)Lˆ(z;x) (20)
Rˆ(V;x) def=
∑
z∈Z−V
p(z)Lˆ(z;x) (21)
In analogy of section IV, Rˆmax(x) is an estimatation of
Rmax(x), the overall risk of the situation9 and Rˆ(V;x) is
an approximation of R(V;x). It represents the risk of not
computing with the physical simulator the contingencies not
in V .
V. RESULTS
In this section, we will show the results of the experiments
carried out: we conduct systematic experiments on small size
benchmark grids from Matpower [11], a library commonly
used to test power system algorithms [12]. We report results
on the largest case studied: a 118-nodes grid with n = 186
lines.
We generate 500 different grid states changing the injections
x of the initial grid given in Matpower. To generate semi-
realistic data, we used our knowledge of the French grid,
to mimic the spatio-temporal behavior of real data [6]. For
example, we enforced spatial correlations of productions and
consumptions and mimicked production fluctuations, which
are sometimes disconnected for maintenance or economical
reasons. Target values were then obtained by computing re-
sulting flows in all lines with the AC power flow simulator
Hades2.
On these 500 cases, we then computed, still using
the high-end simulator Hades2, the full "N-1" (making
500 × 186 = 93 000 load flow computations). Among this
dataset, 75% have been used for training our model, and
the rest (25%) for finding the best architecture and meta-
parameters (learning rate, number of units per layer, number
of layers, etc.) for the neural networks. We note that, to be
able to estimate the overall generalization of our method, we
don’t train our neural network on double contingencies.
For the calibration dataset, we simulate 100 different grid
states x, and the full "N-1" and "N-2" for all of these
simulations. The test set is also composed of 100 different
grid states, and their full "N-1" and "N-2". The grid states in
the test set are different from the one of the calibration set
and the one in the training / validation set, and have never
been seen during either training, or parameters estimation.
9eg this is an estimate of the risk define in the GARPUR framework, see
[8].
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We also want to emphasize that the distributions of the
test set (representing the data the network will be tested
on) and the distribution of the training set (data available
for training the model, corresponding to what operators do
today) are different: the test set is composed of single and
double contingencies whereas the training counts only single
contingencies.
The first section presents results in the estimation of the total
risk Rmax relying solely on machine learning, with almost no
computing cost. In the second subsection, we show how the
estimation of the most dangerous contingencies using the slow
simulator can improve these approximations.
A. Estimation of the total risk Rmax relying on machine
learning only
The figure 1a presents the risk of the 100 situations of
the test set: the true risk Rmax is represented in blue and
is computed with the physical simulator according to the
equation 110, and in orange the estimated risk Rˆmax, defined
in equation 2011. In operational processes, the true risk Rmax
is unknown. For clarity in the representation, the 100 test set
situations have been sorted in increasing order of Rmax.
As we can see on the figure 1a (left), an estimate of the
overall risk is possible. Our estimate Rˆmax is quite close on
average of the total risk Rmax. The MAPE12 is 8.7%: Globally,
we are also able to predict which situations will be the riskiest:
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the estimate and
the true values is 0.96: there exists almost a linear relation
between the proposed estimate and the actual true value.
But, for the most interesting cases, where the true risk is
the highest, the performance decreases. In the most interesting
cases for the TSO, the empirical risk estimation is bellow the
true risk, which can be misleading, and is not suitable.
This estimation of the risk only relies on machine learning.
This has limitation as we just exposed. In the next subsection,
we will expose how a careful use of a physical simulator can
increase the precision of the estimation of the risk.
B. Estimation of the residual risk R(V) with machine learning
In this section we will propose a second method, that will
combine machine learning and physical simulators to estimate
the overall dangerousness of a grid state.
In practice, the proposed methodology allows to rank the
contingencies in decreasing order of risk (according to the
method describe in section IV). In real time, we can rely on
the slow simulator to study carefully the riskiest ones. And this
is the whole idea behind the "residual risk": riskiest situations
are studied with physical simulators and the others are not.
Let’s first consider the top n (recall that n is the number
of power lines) contingencies that are simulated with the
10This is not available in practice as it would require too much call to the
physical simulator.
11This is the evaluation of the risk using the fast proxy alone, that come
almost for free - a speed up of more than a 1000 is achievable in first
experiments.
12Mean Absolute Percentage Error, define for two vector x and y of size
m, MAPE(x, y) = 1
m
.
∑∣∣∣xi−yiyi ∣∣∣.
physical simulator. This is representative of what operators
do today when they compute the full "N-1". On the contrary
of what operator do today 1) our strategy does not rely on
simulating always the same kind of contingencies (all the
single contingencies in today’s operational processes) 2) use
machine learning to evaluate the residual risk R(V).
In this framework, the overall risk can be evaluated as being:
the true risk p(z).L(z;x) for the "top n" contingencies ranked
according to the results of the neural network (see section
IV). We then add the empirical residual risk pi(z).Lˆ(z;x) for
all the other contingencies. The results for this new estimate
of the risk are presented in figure 1b (right). As we can see,
there is a significant improvement. Using a slow simulator
can drastically help increasing the precision of the risk. The
MAPE between this new estimates and the real value is 2.5%
compares to 8.7% with the machine learning only.
This phenomenon can be explained. The estimation of the
residual risk is easier than the one of the total risk as shown
in the figure 2. This figure presents the error between the
estimated residual risk (available in real time) and the true
residual risk, as function of the number of calls to the physical
simulator. For measuring the error, we choose to use the
MAPE (defined in the previous subsection). We zoomed the
plot on the interesting part for the TSO when the number of cal
to the slow simulator is less than n (the number of line in the
power grid). This corresponds to actual operational processes,
when operators compute the full "N-1".
As we can see on the figure 2, the error on the residual risk
decreases after a few calls to the simulator. This is not proper
to the error used, the same shape is obtained when considering
other error measures (such as the Root Mean Squared Error).
The error is divided by 3 if we compare the error on the Rmax
and the error on the residual risk after n calls to the physical
simulator. This is not surprising: the neural network makes
a good job in ranking the contingencies but seems to have
trouble identifying "how much" they are dangerous, especially
for the most dangerous ones: the "extreme cases". The neural
network seems to make a decent job in treating "average"
cases, but to assess the risk of more dangerous contingencies,
it is better to use a physical simulator.
Even if our model is trained only on the single contingencies
(eg less that 1% of the grid states it is evaluated), the neural
network is still able to accurately estimate the residual risk
globally, provided that the impact of the most dangerous
contingencies is quantified with a physical simulator.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach to evaluate the
dangerousness of a grid state with respect to some random
events (in our case the unplanned disconnection of power
lines). Results are evaluated on a standard benchmark. Our
methodology can be summarized as follows:
(1) Train a neural network to mimic a load flow simulator,
on the data available.
(2) Use it (on new test data) to evaluate how close each
line it to its thermal limits. We showed in this paper that even
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Histogram representing the total risk, in is orange the empirical risk Rˆmax defined in section IV. In blue is the true
total risk Rmax for the 100 situations of the test set (a) when relying solely on machine learning (see section V-A) and (b) on
allowing n = 186 calls to the physical simulator (see section V-B).
Fig. 2: Representation of the error (MAPE) in the residual
risk estimation for the 100 grid states of the test set as
function of the number of calls to the physical simulator. The
error bar represents the [25%-75%] confidence interval.
if the test data is drawn from a different distribution than the
training data, this estimations works. Then rank contingencies
in decreasing order of severity.
(3) Estimate the risk of a simulations directly using machine
learning, which allow great speed up in computational time,
and thus to go beyond what is feasible today.
(4) If a physical simulator is available, with almost no more
computational cost than what is done today, a better estimation
is achievable by using the physical simulator on the worst
contingencies, and relying on machine learning to estimate
solely the least dangerous ones. In that case, even when facing
unseen contingencies during training, the estimated residual
risk is really close to the true one. Today the estimation of the
risk over a lot of different events is difficult, as it requires too
many computations if we rely purely on physical simulators.
Future work include detecting the amount of dangerous
single contingencies, or adapting this framework in a wider
area, where multiple grid states are evaluated at the same time.
This could lead to rank contingencies from different grid states
and could be used when studying forecasted grid states.
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